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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
V. J. LUND, WILLARD E. KNIBBEE,
ERNIE A. POULSEN and EVAN W.
HANSEN, representing a Class of Persons
residing and owning real property in Cottonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah,
Plaintiff s-Appelktnts,

vs.
COTTONWOOD MEADOWS COMPANY, a
partnership consisting of W. ALLEN PELTON, and Others unknown, also SALT
LAKE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision
of the State of Utah, and PERSYL RICHARDSON, Director of the Salt Lake County Building and Zoning Inspection Dept.,

1

l
No.
r Case
10015

J

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF

RESPOXDE~rr

('( fl"l'() ~'rOOD ~lEADO\VS COMPANY

~TATE~IENT

OF NA TURE OF CASE
1

Respondent adopts n ppellants' Staten1ent of the N ature of the ca~t'.
Dl~POSITIOX

OF LO\YER COl-:-RT

Respondent adopts the appellants' statement of the
Disposition in the Lower Court.
HELlEF SOUGHT OX APPEAL
Respondent is seeking affirmance of the judgment
granted by the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake
County. rtah, awarding sum1nary judgn1ent in favor of
DefPndants-Respondents.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

STATE:J[EN'T OF ~fATERIAL FACTS
Respondent finds the State1nent of :Material Facts
in Appellants' Brief so incomplete that we set forth
herein our own Statement of 1faterial Facts, arranged
in the sequence to fit not only the chronological happenings but the arguments of our own brief.
Defendant-Respondent Cottonwood :Meadows Company, hereinafter referred to throughout this brief as
"'Respondent", entered into an earnest n1oney agreement
on Jan nary 12, 1962 to purchase certain lands hereinafter referred to as "Cottowood Meadows Estates." (R.
35) Prior to the execution of the earnest money receipt
on January 12, 1962, Respondent ascertained from the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission that the applicable zoning ordinances then in effect permitted construction of a mobile home park on said premises, which
were then classified as Agricultural Zone A-2. (R. 36)
On January 30, 1962 Evan W. Hansen, one of the plaintiffs herein, filed a written application to change the
area from a classification of Agricultural Zone A-2 which
permitted trailer courts, to Residential Zone S-1A,
which did not permit same. (R. 106) One of the reasons
for the request to amend the zoning from A-2 to S-lA
was to stop a mobile home park from being built. (R.107)
On February 8, 1962, Respondent completed the earnest
money agreement by purchasing said Cottonwood Meadows Estates and taking formal assignment of a Uniform
Real Estate Contract. (R. 36) As of July 1, 1963, Respondent had actually paid for the purchase of said
premises the sum of $44,491.41. (R. 26) On March 5
Respondent engaged engineers to prepare plans and to
do the required engineering work in order to make application for a building permit. (R. 36-7) On March 27
Respondent made application for a building permit for
said mobile home trailer park (R. 37), and paid the
building permit fee on April 3, 1962. On April10, 1962,
the subdivision committee of the Planning Commission
gave approval to the general lay-out for the mobile home
park. (R. 105) The plans were approved by the Planning Commission on April 24, 1962, with the condition
2
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that an alternate plan be submitted changing the mobile
homr spn<·Ps, and the set-backs to conform to the zoning
and mohilP home park ordinances. (R. 108) The staff
of the Planning Commission was opposed to permitting
a mobilP home park in the Cottonwood Meadows Estates
(R. 108) but the Planning Commission was never reluctant in planning the mobile home park and actually approved it on April 24, 1963. (R. 87 and R. 108)
Pursuant to requirements of section 5-4-7 of the
Nnlt Lake Count~· mobile home park ordinance Respondent was required to, and did, dedicate a portion of
its proywrty for street purposes as a condition to the
issuance of the building permit. (R. 37) Salt Lake
( 'ount~· on April 25, 1962, adopted an amendment to
its zoning ordinances changing the classification of the
nn'a herein involved from Agricultural Zone A-2 to Residential Zone S-1A, which amendments became effective
on Jfa~· 10, 1962. (R. 37 and R. 110-111) On June 12,
1962, the Planning Director signed the plan for the mobile
home park, dating it back to the tin1e when it was approved h~· the Planning Commission, April 10, 1962.
On J nne 12, 1962, there was nothing of an administrative nature remaining to be done by the Planning Commission before issuance of the building permit. (R. 108)
A letter was written by the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission to the County Attorney asking whether a
building permit should be issued. (R. 87) Under date
of June 8, 1962, four days before the Planning Director
actually signed the plan for the mobile home park, the
County Attorney by written inter-office memo to Doug
Campbell, Planning Commission, answered this inquiry
h~· stating "that the Planning Commission should sign
and approve the plat and the building and zoning inspection department should issue the building permit."
(Exhibit D-4) The County Attorney's inter-office memo
recites that the above conclusion is based upon the following facts :
"Application was made for the building permit and fees tendered and the plat filed with your
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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offices. Changes in the engineering were necessary requiring amended plats at various times,
Pach one at the request of your office. In the
interim, the Planning Commission approved the
park subject to some further changes being made
in the plat to the satisfaction of the subconunittee.
Prior to this satisfaction, the zoning ordinances
was changed prohibiting such parks in this area.
''It would appear that all that remained to
be done were basically ministerial acts, that all of
the requirements of the ordinances had been met
by the applicants except making requested
changes in the plat. 'This would appear to be similar to the interim between preliminary approval
and final approval of a subdivision where the preliminary approval is the key date subject to the
Inaking of any required changes in the plat."
(Exhibit D-4-)
On Septen1ber 10, 1962, the building permit was issued to Respondent for the mobile home park, which is
now substantially built. (R. 28) But for the changes
required by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
the building permit would have been issued prior to the
purported zoning change. (R. 37)
The area involved in this action is a more or less
wooded area. (R. 99) No particular physical change
occurred in the neighborhood in the year 1962. (R. 106)
Nothing occurred up to August 29, 1963 to change the
neighborhood from an agricultural classification to something else. (R. 107) 'The reason given by the applicants
for the zoning change from A-2 to S-1A in January, 1962
was that applicants wanted to stop a certain mobile park
from coming in. ( R. 107) The Director of the Salt
Lake County Zoning Department of the Planning ComInission, Mr. Ralph McClure, testified that the application for the zoning amendment filed on January 30, 1962,
specifically referred to the fact that the subject area was
originally classified agricultural because of the desire of
4
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proJwrty 0\\'ll('l'~ to nmntain the area as agricultural to
lw tt~Prl for farming and raising and grazing of farm
animal~. ( R. 110)
~f r. ~IcClure further testified the
an•a ~till rPmains substantially agricultural today. (R.
110)
\Yiwn Salt Lake County was considering the adoption of thP ~eneral l\lobile Home Park Ordinance in
~larch of 19(il, they also considered a recommendation
mnd(' hv the staff that would have deleted mobile home
park~ f.rom tlw permitted uses in an Agricultural Zone
.\-~. llowPvPr, this was not adopted pursuant to that
rf'commendation. (R. 111-112) The area was rezoned
rffectivf' -:\fa~· 10, 1962 from Zone A-2 to S-1A. Some
tinw mueh later than this Salt Lake County amended the
pc>rmitted uses in an agricultural Zone A-2 by deleting
t!H· right to have a trailer court therein. (R. 112)
Plantiffs Lund, Knibbee, Poulsen and Hansen filed
tlwir complaint as representatives of a class of persons
re~iding and owning real property in Cottonwood
HPights, ~nlt Lake County. (R. 1) Plaintiff-Appellant
Hansen had personal knowledge that a building permit
had brf'n issued to Respondent for the construction of
a mobilP h01ne park, and said Hansen acquired this
knowledge at about the time of the issuance of the permit,
which was issued on September 10, 19·62. (R. 137)
On January 11, 1963, Respondent made an offer to
purchase the Bayou Country Club property, which offer
was accepted by the Receiver in Civil Case No. 136319,
Third Judicial District, on or about the 20th of J anuary. 1963, and confirmed by the Court on February 6,
ti, 1963. (R. 39) The Bayou Country Club property is
contiguous to the Cottonwood J\1:eadows Estates and
contains club house facilities, and a swimming pool;
Dt•fendant purchased this property for a total purchase
price of $112,500.00 for use in connection with the proposed mobile home park in order to enhance its attractiveness for business purposes. (R. 38) Respondent
would not have made this purchase except for the contemplated utility to the mobile home park. (R. 39)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rl his pending lawsuit was comn1enced by plaintiffs
1

on February 21, 1963. (R. 39)
Salt Lake County and Persyl Richardson, Director
of the Salt Lake County Building and Zoning Inspection
Departments, Defendants and Respondents herein, by
their answer filed in the lower court on June 26, 1963,
assert that the building permit was legally and properly
issued to Respondent Cottonwood Meadows Company on
September 10, 1962, which permit has never been revoked
or cancelled. (R. 33)
In addition to the "Unifonn Zoning Ordinances of
Salt Lake County" (Exhibit D-3) which are quoted from
in Appellants' "Statement of Material Facts," Respondent calls attention to the Mobile Home Park Ordinance
of Salt Lake County (Exhibit D-1) adopted on September 6, 1961. This ordinance provides in part as follows:
"5-4-2:

DEFINITIONS.

* * *
"(b) 'Mobile home' means any vehicle or
similar portable structure having been constructed with wheels (whether or not such wheels have
been removed) and having no foundation other
than wheels, jacks or skirtings and so designed
or constructed as to permit occupancy for dwelling or sleeping purposes.
" (c) 'Mobile home park' means any plot of
ground upon which two or more mobile homes,
occupied for dwelling or sleeping purposes, are
located, regardless of whether or not a charge
is made for such accommodation.

* * *

"5-4-3:

LICENSE; TE1fPORARY PERMIT.

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to
maintain or operate a mobile home park within
the limits of Salt Lake County, Utah, unless such
6
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person ~hall first obtain a license, and permit, except that:

• • •

":l--l-5:

APPLICANT FOR PERMIT

(a) Before an application for a Mobile
Home Park permit can be filed, plans and specification therefor shall be submitted to the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission for its investigation and approval. (Four (4) B & W prints
of tlH• proposed park shall be filed on paper not
smaller than 17 x 22 inches and shall include the
following:
( 1)

The name and address of the applicant.

(2) The location and legal description of
the :Mobile Home Park.
(3)

Finish contour lines at one foot inter-

vals.
( -l) Location of all existing public streets
within two hundred (200) feet of the proposed
park.

(5) The number, size, location, and type of
all Mobile Home spaces.
(6) The location, size, and specifications for
construction of roadways and walkways.
(7) Plans and specifications of all buildings, improvements, and facilities to be constructed within the Mobile Home Park.
(8) The location and size of all public utility
lines within the Mobile Home Park.
(9) Such further information as required by
this Ordinance or that may be required by the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission to enable
it to determine if the proposed park will comply
with legal requirements.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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* * *
""5-4-6:

LOCATION

"Location of mobile home parks shall be
regulated by the Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake
County. Where any boundary of a park directly
abuts property which is improved with a permanent residential building or directly abuts unimproved property which may under existing laws
and regulations be used for permanent residential construction, a six ( 6) foot high fence, wall,
or hedge properly related to surrounding topography and the character of the surrounding development shall be provided along such boundary.

"5-4-7:

STREET DEDICATION

"The developer of the mobile home park shall
be required to dedicate and improve to county
standards all streets within the proposed mobile
home park that are determined by the County
Planning Commission necessary to provide adequate neighborhood circulation.

* * *
"5-4-9:

MINIMUM: J\1:0BILE HOME
PARK AREA

"The minimum area for any :Mobile Home
Park shall be five ( 5) acres.
"5-4-10:

MOBILE HOME PARK PLAN

"The mobile home park shall conform to the
following requirements:
" (a) The park shall be located on a welldrained site, properly graded to insure rapid
drainage and free from stagnant pools of water.
"(b) Each park shall provide mobile home
spaces, and each such space shall be clearly defined or delineated. Each space shall have an
area of not less than 3,000 square feet exclusive

8
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of ~t n·Pt~ and sidewalks and a width of not less
than -lO f'PPt.
'" (e) l\fohile hmnes shall he so located on
Pach space so that there shall be at least a 15 foot
<'lParan<'e between rnobile homes, provided, howPVPr, that with respect to mobile homes parked
end-to-end, the end-to-end clearance may be less
than 1;) feet but shall be not less than 10 feet.
~ o rnobile home shall be located closer than 15
feet to an~· building within the park or to any
pro1wrty line of the park which d<f,5 not abut
upon a public street or highway. No mobile home
~hall be located closer to any property line of
the park abutting upon a public street or highway
than 25 feet or such other distance as may be
established by ordinance or regulation as front
yard set-back requirement with respect to conventional buildings in the zoning district in which
the mobile home park is located.

.Jl.-

" (d) All mobile home spaces shall abut upon
a driveway street. Driveway streets within the
rnobile home park shall be continuous wherever
reasonably possible; where it is necessary to provide a driveway street that is not continuous
adequate paved vehicular turning space shall be
provided at the closed end thereof.
" (e) Walkways constructed of asphalt or
concrete not less than two feet wide shall be provided from the mobile home spaces to the service
buildings.
" (f) All driveway streets and walkways
within the park shall be hard surfaced and
lighted from sunset to sunrise w·ith lamps of not
less than 100 watts each, spaced at intervals of
not more than 100 feet.
"(g) Each park shall provide service buildings to house such toilet, bathing and other saniSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
9 administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tation facilities as are hereinafter more parti{'ularly prescribed.
"(h) An electrical outlet supplying at least
100-115 volts, 50 amperes shall be provided for
each mobile home space.
"(i) Sufficient parking space shall be provided for the parking of at least one motor vehicle upon each mobile home space.
"(j) Mobile home pads shall be not less than
10 ft. by 40 ft. and constructed of concrete at
least four ( 4") inches thick."
"5-4-11: WATER SUPPLY"
(Pure drinking water and adequate hot water
must be available at all times.)
"5-4-12: S-ANITATION F ACILITIE8"
('Toilets, urinals, showers, or tub baths must
be available.)
"5-4-13: SERVICE BUILDINGS"
(Well lighted, screened, and ventilated service buildings to house sanitation facilities must
be provided.)
"5-4-14: SEWAGE AND REFUGE DISPOSAL"
(Waste from showers, tubs, toilets, urinals,
lavatories and slop sinks must be discharged into
public sewer system.)
"5-4-15: GARBAGE RECEPT'A:CLES"
(Sanitary garbage cans must be available in
adequate numbers to permit disposal of all garbage and rubbish ,and must be collected at least
twice a week.)
"5-4-16: INSECT AND RODENT CONTROL"
(All harborage places for rodents, etc., shall
be eliminated or effectively treated.)

10
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"5-~-17:

FIRE PROTECTION"

(..:\dPquate fire extinguishing equipment,
located to assure proper fire protection
1nust be available at all times.)
proper]~·

.. 5-~-18:

SUPERVISION"

(A duly authorized attendant or caretaker
shall be in charge at all times to assure clean
orderly and sanitary condition.)

• • •

"5--!-20:

• • •

BUILDING INSPECTOR TO
ENFORCE

. . .,

"That all ordinances or parts or ordinances
in conflict herewith are repealed.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
THA T APPELLANTS FAILED
TO EXHAlT8T THEIR ADl\fiNIS:TRATIVE
R Ij~~ll~DY.
FI~DING

1

Respondent has quoted at length from the Mobile
Home Park Ordinance so that this Court will have a true
perspective of the nature of the trailer court here involved. Obviously it is not a "sheepherders camp" or a
"cattle camp" as suggested by appellants in their brief.
The building permit authorizing the construction of a
mobile home park on the subject lands was formally
issued to the Respondents on September 10, 1962. No
appeal of any kind was ever filed by any of the appellants
requesting a review of the issuance of the building permit. This lawsuit was commenced by the plaintiffs on
February 21, 1963. Appellants in their agrument under
Point I of their brief lay great stress on certain permissive language appearing in Section 17-27-16, Utah
Code ~-\nnotated, 1953. They have italicized the language
showing that an appeal to the Board of Adjustment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"may be taken" by any person aggrieved * * * b)' a
decision of an~r administrative officer * * * made in the
course of the administration or enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution. The key language in
this section of the Code which is mandatory \\'as completely overlooked by appellants. The sentence of Section 17-:27-16 overlooked by appellants provides
"the time within which such appeal must be made
and the form or other procedure relating thereto
shall be as specified in the general rules provided
in writing by the Board of County Commissioners."
The Board of County Commissioners have adopted a
regulation which is in evidence in this case which again,
using mandatory language, provides that an appeal to the
Board of Adjustment must be taken within ninety days
after the cause arises.
Thus, the real crucial question before this Court
is whether the Appellants are persons aggrieved by a
decision of an administrative officer made in the course
of the administration of the zoning resolution. There
can be no doubt that the issuance of a building permit
involves a decision by an administrative officer in the
course of the administration of the zoning resolution.
Appellants argue that they are not "persons aggrieved."
Appellants quote from Webster's International Dictionary, which defines "aggrieved" as follows: "adversely
affected in respect of legal rights; suffering from an
infringement or denial of legal rights." They then take
the position that they are not aggrieved by any action
because the action was not taken directly against them.
However, the whole gist of Appellant's lawsuit is that
they have been injured and adversely affected in respect
of their legal rights by the issuance of the building permit. Why else are Appellants involved in this lawsuit
except the fact that they believe they have been adversly
affected hy the issuance of the building permit. From

12
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tlwir ~tandpoint, to arg·n<' that tlu·y are not adversely
aff•·<·tt·d i~ to approach the ridi('nlous.
,\ ppPllnnb had timPly knowh,dge of the fact that a
hnilding twrmit had be<'n issued as Appellant Hansen,
who l'Ppres(:'nts a class of persons residing and owning
rPal proJwrt:v in Salt Lake County, personally knew about
thr i~~u:uwP of the building permit around September
10, 19(i~.

f n ('On~idering
j~tratiVP rPmedies,

the doctrine Of exhaustion Of admincourts almost invariably make a distinction lwtwePn a situation where the Appellant challPn~P~ in it~ entirdy the validity of a zoning ordinance
~md a situation when' the Appellant is simply challenging
tht• propriet~· of administrative action taken by administi·ntive personnel and in which the ordinance itself is
not undPr attack. Most courts say that if the challenges
are to the entire ordinance there may not be the same
ha~ic rea~ons for requiring exhaustion of administrative
rPnwdies ,,·here the appeals body who would hear and
make the admini~trative review would simply be reviewing their own adoption of the ordinance. However, it
~t't'lllS that almost without exception where the challenge
in thP eourts is n1ade, not upon the validity of the ordinance, hut upon administrative action such as the issuanrP of a building permit, that the applicant must exhaust
hi~ administrative remedies as provided and authorized
hy law before a court will grant relief. That is precisely
tlw ~ituation before this Court in the subject case. ·The
challenge is entirely one related to administrative action
takrn by administrative personnel of the county. The
entirr n:>ason for the rule requiring the exhaustion of
administratin· re1nedies is thus applicable to the facts
of this case.
The n1andatory language of the Utah statute which
that the appeal m'ltst be taken pursuant to the
time deadline set forth in the regulation adopted by the
County recognizes and, in fact, puts Utah in that group
of statrs which has actually codified the rule that the
requin·~
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adrninistrative remedv must be exhausted before resort
rnay be taken to the ~ourts.
In the face of the mandatory language jn Section
17-27-16, U.C.A., 1953, and the mandatory language of
the County ordinance requiring the exhaustion of the
administrative remedy, the construction which Appellants have placed upon Sectjon 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953,
would, in effect, nullify the provisions of Section 16,
and the ordinance adopted thereunder. ·To adopt the
construction requested by Appellants in their brief would
1nean that the court would have to ignore completely
the mandatory provisions of Section 16. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that whenever
possible, construction be placed upon each section of a
statute which would make each section operative. This
can be done by simply construing Section 16 as being
mandatory and Section 23 as being declarative of the
common law right to take the matter to court after
exhaustion of the statutory administrative remedy. Provo
City v. Claudin, 63 P. 2d 570. Any other construction of
Sections 16 and 23 would result in a conflict between the
two sections of the same law.
Under Appellants' theory with respect to Section
17-27-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, appellants would
have their election whether to take an administrative
appeal or whether to commence an independent action
in the courts. If they_ made their election to forego the
administrative appeal, under their theory they would
be entitled to file their suit in the District Court under
Section 23 at any time within the applicable general
statute of limitations. This could mean that the holder
of a building permit from the county would not be in
a position to commence construction with complete
safety until the statute of limitations had run. Let us
take the facts of this case for purposes of illustration.
If Appellants are correct, they would have until the
exhaustion of the general statute of limitations before
thev would necessarily have needed to commence the
pre~sent suit to revoke the building permit which wa~

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i~slwd on HPptetnber 10, 1!Hi:2. By the very terms of
the building pertnits i~~uPd by Salt Lake County, they
.. xpire thenw~dve~ if construction is not commenced within otH' vear from the date of issuance. A nervous builder
might iuwt> to <·hoose between con1mencing construction
ht>t'on• t IH• perrnit expires or awaiting the tolling of
thP general statut<> of limitations, at which tilne, not
having a valid permit in effect, he would have to reapply for onP and start all over on the same merry-goround. Thi~ constn1ction of section 23 would make it
impossihh· for building and construction enterpreneurs
to proePed- without the risk of a court case upsetting their plans after having made heavy investments.
l f we assume, on the other hand, that Respondent's
po::; ition is correct, then anyone desiring to contest the
i::;suance of a building permit would have to do so within
nim•ty days. If no contest is filed within the ninety days,
then the entrepreneur could proceed with full safety
that no remedy would be available at a later date to
upset his expenditure of funds in the construction of
the enterprise. In order to make the zoning and building- laws workable from the standpoint of the public at
largP, we submit that the only construction which can
work with fairness to all concerned is to require any
aggrieved parties to exhaust their administrative reme(li(•::; as provided in the ordinance, to-wit: within ninety
days, rather than allowing them the full time permitted
hy the general statute of limitations within which to commence an original action in court.
For a case that gives an exhaustive discussion of
the whole theory back of the rule that one must exhaust
one's administrative remedies before resorting to the
courts, see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeals, 109
P. 2d 9-1:2. In this case there is a complete review of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
including the conclusion of the court that relief must
be sought from the administrative body and this remedy
exhausted before the courts will act where an administrative remedy is provided by statute. In fact, the court
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held that no one is entitled to judicial relief for an imposed or threatened injury until the prescribed admini~
trative remedy has been exhausted.
For a Utah case in which the litigants exhausted
their administrative remedy and then appealed to the
courts, see Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Company,
92 P. 2d 724. This case involved a supposed violation
of zoning ordinances. It was unnecessary to discuss
the doctrine of administrative remedies in this case
sirnply because Walton followed the prescribed statutory administrative steps and then appealed to the
courts, where he was successful in reversing the adverse ad1ninistrative rulings.
To the same effect, see Cliff v. Bilett, 241 P. 2d
437, decided in 1952 by the Colorado Supreme Court;

Metcalf v. Los Angeles County, 148 P. 2d 645.
Appellants in their research found one case so completely identical to the ordinances, statutes and the
general factual situation present in this case that we
feel compelled to set forth the case in some detail. We
refer to ~Rosenthal v. City of Dallas, 211 S.W. 2d, 279.
In this case the state statute provided:
"Appeals to the Board of Adjustment may
be taken by any person aggrieved or by any
officer department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken
·within a reasonable time as provided by the rules
of the Board by filing with the officer from
whom the appeal is taken and with the board."
Anoth0r section of the same statute provided:
"In case any building or structure is erected,
reconstructed, altered, repaired, converted or
1naintained or any building, structure or land is
used in violation of this act, or of any ordinance

16
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or otlwr n·.~ulation
t'PtTed IH·r .. hy, tJw
the muni<·ipalit:· in
may in:-;titut<> any
<'PPdinp;:-; to prevent
:-:t ruction, Pte."

1nade under authority conproper local authorities of
addition to other remedies
appropriate action or prosuch unlawful erection, con-

This ea:-;p wa:-; brought by the City of Dallas charging- the dPI\•ndant with violation of zoning ordinances
und maintaining a public and private nuisance. A
building JWrmit had been issued by the proper admini~trativP offiePr. Subsequent thereto notices were sent
to the HPspondent advising him to stop work on the
projPet because thP permit was issued in error. This
notice to quit, hmn•v<>r, was many months after the
original issuance of the permit and after start of actual
construction was wPll under way. The court at page
:2!l:) said:
"In tlw instant case the permit issued to
appellant for operation of a cold storage plant
including Hwat curing, was based on a specific
finding of the evidence of a nonconforming use
h:· the building inspector who is charged with
thP duty of enforcing this ordinance, from which
no appeal was prosecuted by either city officials
or interested iHdividuals. In my opinion the action of the building inspector became in a sense
res judicata."
Tlw opinion continues by quoting from a Texas
Law RPviPw article by Professor Davis as follows:
'"To smne extent this theory of direct and
collateral attack has been carried over into adIninistrative la\\·. The theory is that a party who
fails to make a direct attack on an administrative order is barred by res judicata from making
a collateral attack except when the order is void
on account of such a reason as fraud, lack of
jurisdiction, or denial of a fair hearing."
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The decision continues by further quoting from
Bassett on Zoning at page 106, as follows:
"Where a building department, through an
employee, has issued a permit for a nonconforming building and construction has proceeded
and no appeal to the Board of Appeals has been
taken by neighbors, a permit will not be revoked."
In summary, the Texas appellate court held that
in the face of no appeal having been taken by the city
from the original issuance of the permit, that the pernlit holder acquired a vested property right in the
permit and that the attempted revocation, even though
by the city itself, was arbitrary and unreasonable. The
City of Dallas was estopped from any further action
to enjoin the building project despite the statutory
language which provided that in addition to other
'remedies the city might institute appropriate action or
proceedings to prevent unlawful erection, construction,
etc. (It is interesting to note that what was originally
shown as the dissenting opinion of Justice Looney, from
which these quotes have been made, by virtue of the
Chief Justice changing his opinion, apparently on rehearing, actually became the prevailing opinion of the
court. See the last sentence of the concurring opinion
of the Chief Justice.)
Had an administrative appeal been taken by the
Appellants as provided by state statute and by Salt
Lake County ordinance, a complete record could have
been 1nade with respect to all of the administrative detail which preceded the issuance of the building permit.
For example, there is evidence in this abbreviated record
that the subordinate administrative staff of the Salt
Lake County Planning and Zoning offices were opposed
to the granting of a building permit for the erection
of the mobile home park. There is also evidence in
the record that the Salt Lake County Planning Comrnission was never reluctant in planning the mobile home
park and actually approved it, as reflected in their April

18
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rninntP~.
dt>('i~ion

It is ent irPiy po~~ible that despite the policy
of the ( 0nunission the subordinate administrative personnel being opposed to that policy decision
mav havP ~lowPd down the administrative actions and
al't;mlly rPtarded the final issuance of the building permit. This is the type of matter that should have been
straightened out h~' a timely appeal at the administratin' IPYPl so that a complete record could have been
marlP of tho~<' actions and decisions while it was still
at tlw administrative level.
1

In the area of planning and zoning the County is
adually functioning in a quasi legislative area and when

it has eompleted its function, including the review of its
own actions, its decision becomes "the law of the case,"
unless it is modified or overruled by appropriate appeal
therefrom. In the absence of appeal from an administratin' decision it becomes final and is the "law of the case"
forever, to be applied in any subsequent dispute involving
that same issue.
In the case of Provo City v. Claudin, decided by the
Ptah Supreme Court in 1936 and reported at 63 P. 2d
:170, some most interesting comments are made with
respect to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. ~[r. Claudin made an application to establish a funeral home upon certain described prmnises. It
appears frmn allegations recited that a permit to remodel a hmne was issued but that the application for
permission to construct a funeral parlor was denied.
~lr. Claudin took the matter before the Board of Adjustment, the appeals body, who made findings of fact
and conclusions of law, etc., and denied the right of
the Claudins to convert this property into a funeral
home. The statutes provided that a person aggrieved
hy a decision of the Board of Adjustment could maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court
of competent jurisdiction. Despite this provision, no
appeal was taken from the decision of the Board of
&-\djustment, but instead Claudin remodeled the home
for use as a funeral parlor. Provo City brought this
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action to enJOin Claudin frmn using the home as a
funeral parlor. As a defense to the injunction ~nit
Claudin hit the city with the plea of an unfair ordinance. The Utah Supreme Court held that the trial
court need not consider such matters in issue until they
have bePn tried ad1ninistratively. K ot having appealed
the decision of the Board of Adjustment, Claudin had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and had no
standing in court to challenge the fairness of the ordinance.
Section 17-27-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in
describing the functions of the Board of Adjustment
at the county level provides that persons aggrieved have
a permissive right of appeal. Upon appeals the Board of
Adjushnent has, among others, the power to authorize a
variance under certain specified conditions. This is the
same power referred to in the Claudin case where owners
might suffer special hardships by the ordinance. The
variance may be granted to make the ordinance pliable
enough so as not to militate against the public welfare.
Had Appellants exhausted their administrative remedy
by appealing to the Board of Adjustment, it is entirely
possible that the Board might have considered a variance in favor of Respondent even though they might
have first determined that the building permit should
not have issued. The Appellants, therefore, by ignoring
the requirement that they exhaust their administrative
rmnedy have effectively precluded the Board of Adjustment from even considering the necessity or wisdom
of granting a variance to the defendants. This is but
one more reason why appellants must be required to
exhaust their administrative remedy before taking the
n1atter to the courts. This is particularly true where
the County itself, by its pleadings in this case, is even
now asserting that the permit was properly issued, and
never having been revoked, is valid today. Under this
state of the record, laches, estoppel and failure to exhaust thP ·available ad1ninistrative remedies all stare
Appellants squarely in the face.
20
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POlXrr II
LACH:B~S, OR FAILURE TO
I·:XIL\rST ;\D~lli\ISTRATI\TE REMEDIES
~1.\ Y .TrSTIFY REFFSAL TO REYOKE A
PJ•:H~ll'l, EVI•~N TH01TOH IT WAS ORIGI~.\LLY ISSUED IN YlOLATION OF A
IIASTlLY ADOPTED ZOXING A~fE·ND
J•:STOPPI1~L,

~II•:XT .

.\ ppPllants assert that a building permit which is
in violation of the existing zoning ordinance is
null and void and that no vested rights could be acquired thereundPr even though the permit holder acted
in rPlianeP on said permit. Circumstances may be present in any given ease to justify the court's applying
the doctrines of estoppel, laches or failure to exhaust
admini~tratin' remedies in support of a building permit issued in violation of a hastily adopted zoning
anwndment. Under proper circumstances the invocation of any of these defenses may prevent the granting
of relief to an adjoining landowner who is protesting
<·on~truction pursuant to such a building permit. Re~pondents in this case are not clairning estoppel against
::-;alt Lake County and have no need to make such a
rlaim because Salt Lake County is, even today, asserting the validity of the issuance of the building permit.
The estoppel which Respondents claim is an estoppel
again~t Plaintiff-Appellants who stood by with knowl~'dgt> of the issuance of the pennit without challenging
it through administrative channels, as authorized by
law and ordinance.
i~~ned

Illinois courts have specifically recognized that even
the City may be estopped to deny the validity of a
permit where the pennit was issued under authority
of the legis/afire body of the municipality. See People
c.r rel Deddo v. Thompson, 209 Ill. App. 570, and Hurt
r. Hejhal, :259 Ill. App. 221.
In the Deddo r. Thompson case it appears that
the City Council passed an order directing the ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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missioner of Buildings to issue a permit for tlw construction of a garage near a hospital and school
despite the existence of an ordinance which made it
unlawful to build or maintain a garage within a specified distance from a hospital or school. The court
held that the council could not amend an ordinance
by simply issuing such an order but when the individual
to whom the building order was issued, in reliance
upon such a permit, proceeded and constructed a garage
at large expense and without objection by the school
and hospital authorities and all interested parties, the
City ·would be estopped to refuse to issue a license for
the conduct of the garage and mandamus would lie to
compel its issuance.
Similarly, in the Hurt v. Hejhal case, the City was
held estopped to enjoin the erection of a building as
in violation of a zoning ordinance where the owner
obtained a building permit and the City Council affirmatively authorized him to proceed with the work after
it had been temporarily suspended by the City upon
the complaint of adjoining property owners, and in
reliance upon this act the owner expended a large sum
of money.
The situation is almost identical in the case before
this Court. The building permit was issued by the subordinate administrative personnel of Salt Lake County, the
neighboring land owners slept on their rights and did not
exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing the
issuance of the permit and when this lawsuit was filed
by the neighboring property owners Salt Lake County,
the quaisi sovereign body, filed its answer asserting that
the permit was validly and properly issued and that it
has never been revoked. Salt Lake County even required
Respondent to dedicate a portion of its property f'or
street purposes as a condition to the issuance of the
bu.ilding permit. In relianee upon all of these facts
and the possibility of the permit lapsing for non-use,
Respondent commenced heavy construction immediately
after slnnmary judgment was entered in the trial court

22
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and havP now substantially eomplrtPd a major portion
ol' tlw mobile hmne park. This has been done with the
ohvion~ approval of ~alt Lake County as witnessed by
thPir plPading- and activities in this appeal.
Some courts have held that the zoning law in effect
at the time that the permit application was made should
control. The case that best states this position is State
,.. JJ'oodmansee, 72 N. E. 2d 789 (Ohio 1946). In this
case the petitioner applied for a permit for a poultry
store, which business was allowed under the zoning law
then in effect. The permit was withheld while the zoning law was amended. The court held that the amendment
would not affect property owners' rights with respect to
an application for a permit filed before the ordinance was
amended where the proposed use of the building would
not violate the ordinances at the time the request for
the permit was made. Other cases supporting this view
include State v. Village of Wickliffe, 80 N.E. 2d 200; Vin.e
1'. Zabriskie, 3 Atl. 2d 886 (N. J. 1936) ; Dubow v. Ross,
1731\tlisc. 219,22 N.Y. S. 2d 610 (New York 1938); Hardy
r. Superior Court, 284 Pac. 93 (Wash.1930).
The case of Munrns v. Stenma;n, 314 P. 2d 67 (Calif.
1957) generally holds that a municipal council cannot, by
the enactment of an emergency amendment to a zoning
ordinance, or by ministerial delay, deprive a property
owner of his right to a permit in accordance with the
ordinance in effect at the time of his application for the
permit. To the same general effect see State v. City of
Bellriew, 275 P. 2d 899 (Wash.1954), which case held that
the law in effect, when the only items left undone are
purely ministerial, should control.
This court in Parrish v. Richards, 336 P. 2d 122, announced the doctrine that "in the construction of uncertain or ambiguous restrictions as to the use of property,
the courts shall resolve all doubts in favor of the free and
unrestricted use of the property.'' We submit that if the
court believes there is any uncertainty surrounding the
effect of amendment of the zoning ordinance or surroundSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing the Utah statute and Salt Lake County ordinances
with respect to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies then this court should apply the doctrine
announced in Pa.rrish v. Richards.
Appellants themselves recognize the rule of law at
page 14 of their brief "that if before the ordinance is
amended a party substantially changes his position in
reliance on the ordinance or if only ministerial acts
are left to be performed before a permit is issued, the
permit may, nevertheless, issue despite the adoption
of the amendment." Appellants argue that since we
knew that someone else was trying to get the ordinance
changed that we were on notice during this interval
of time. Respondents assert that not every effort to
mnend the zoning ordinances is successful and that not
every effort to change them requires those holding
building permits or those acquiring property to await
the outcome of the efforts or to assume that in all
cases the proposed changes will be enacted. Appellants
also assert at page 15 of their brief that since there
was an application to amend the ordinance staring the
"Board" in the face which they must rule on prior to
issuing a building permit, that you could hardly say
that there was a ministerial act to be performed. We
know of no rule of law which requires the County
Board to act on an application to amend the ordinance
just because an applieation is filed. The legislatiYe body,
to-wit: the County Commission, might simply table
such an application.
POIN"T III
TIIE A~fENDING ORDINAKCE GHAXGIXO
THE SFB.JECT LANDR TO RESIDENTIAL
ZONE S1-A \YAS AN ILLEGAL SPOT ZONI~G PROVISION.
Prior to 1962 the subject lands were classified as
agricultural Zone A -2. Under this elassification the
following is a partial list of permitted uses; grain storage elevators, farms, liYestock raising and grazing,
24
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l'rnit and Yt>getahlP :-;torage and packing plants, fruit
and VPg"Ptahle :-;tands, fur farms, dairy or creamery,
kemwl:-;, public :-;tahlPs, riding academies, mortuaries,
<'t>IIIPtariL•:-i, hay chopping, hospitals, sanitariums, airport:-;, <·i I'<' \IS or transient amusernents, dude ranches,
golf driving ranges, gun clubs, trailer camps, mines,
quarri<':-i and g-ntYPl pits. (Exhibit D-3, page -t-8.)
Xone of the foregoing uses are permitted in an
area <"la:-;:-;ifiPd a:-; Residential zone Sl-A.
On January 30, 1962 Evan W. I-Iansen, one of the
.\ppellants herein, filed a written application to change
tlw an•a from a classification of Agricultural Zone A-2
which permitted trailer courts, to Residental Zone S1-A,
wh i<'h did not permit trailer courts. The reason for
thP rPqUPHt to amend the zoning was to stop a mobile
home park from being built. (R. 106-7)
The record shows that this area is more or less
wooded: that no particular physical change occurred
in tlw area in 1962; that nothing had occurred to change
the 1/('i.rthl)()rlwod from an agricultural classification.

The Director of the Salt Lake County Zoning Departuwnt of thP Planning Commission testified that the
area \\·as originally classified agricultural because of
the dPsire of the property owners to maintain the area
for farming and raising and grazing of farm animals.
II P further testified that the "area still remains sub~tantially agricultural today."
Despitt> these uncontroverted facts the area was
rPzoned Residential S1-A as of May 10, 19'62. This
''"n~. therefore, an illegal spot zoning ordinance.
~-\~ this Court so aptly put it, "Spot Zoning" cases
are "'generally cases where a particular small tract
within a large district was specially zoned so as to
impose upou it restrictions not in1posed upon the surrounding lands, • • • not done in pursuance of any genPral or comprehensive plan." Marshall v. Salt Lake
City, 141 P. 2d 70-l at 711. Generally, where a parcel
of land is classified differently from all the surrounding
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area for no apparent reason or purpose except to favor
the applicant for the zoning change, it is referred to
as spot zoning, and is invalid because it is discriminatory. That is the situation in this case as shown by
the record.
'The Third Circuit in Wilcox v. Pittsburgh, 121 F.
2d 835, held that a complaint which alleged that an
amended zoning ordinance selected one block out of a
larger area; that the amendment to the zoning ordinance had an instigator; and finally that there had been
no change in conditions between passage of the original
ordinance and the amendments, stated a good cause
of action. The opinion points out that courts have not
been unworldly enough to ignore the effect of an anxious
client and persistent counsel on the minds of councilmen. If in addition, there has been no ch~ge of the
neighborhood character, then amendment is unjustified.
As conditions are of necessity the basis and justification
for zoning, clearly a change in the former is essential
to a change in the latter.

~

Obviously, Plaintiff-Appellant Hansen and those
who also signed the petition to amend the zoning ordinance in this case were the instigators. We even have
their self confessed motive. They didn't want a mobile
hmne park to be built near their homes. But is this
enough to justify an mnendment changing the area from
one classification to another? \Ye submit that it is not.
Salt Lake County, if it did not want to permit
1nobile home parks in this area which was obviously
classified properly as an agricultural zone, should have
merely amended the permitted uses in that zone by
deleting mobile home parks therefrom, instead of improperly reclassifying the zone.
POINT IY
THE MINIMUM LOT AREA FOR EACH
AND EVERY ::t\IOBILE HO~IE IS NOT RESTRICTED TO ONE F1'LL ACRE.

26
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Salt LakP County adopted the ~lobile Home Park
Ordinan('P on HPph•mlw r 6, 1961. This ordinance spet·i t'il'ally provided in Section :20 "that all ordinances or
parts of ordinances in conflict hereof are repealed."
This ordinancP also definPs a rnobile home "as any
Vl'hielP or similar portable structure having been con~t rneh•d with wheels whether or not they have been
rpmovt'd and having no foundation other than wheels,
jack~ or skirtings and so designed or constructed so
us to pt-rmit oeeupancy for dwelling or sleeping purpo~Ps.'' A mobile home park is defined "as any plot
nf ground on which two or more rnobile homes occupied for dwelling or sleeping purposes are located regard!<'~~ of whether or not a charge is made for such
accommodation." Upon the adoption of this 1961 ordinance there can be no question that "trailer camps"
or any other for1n of n1obile home previously referred
to hy ordinances in Salt Lake County was now to be
controlled by the new Mobile Home Park provision.
Appellants sarcastically argue at page 17 of their brief
that "trailer camps" in an agricultural area such as
ZonP A-:2 would contemplate the sarne being sheepherdPr's can1ps or cattle camps. Such an assumption, of
course, completely ignors the fact that the Mobile Home
Park Ordinance had been adopted in 1961 and further
ignores the fact that all ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict therewith have been repealed. Appellants also argue in this section of their brief that
the residential home owners had great and important
inYPstnHJnts in their homes and, by inference at least,
indicate that this should have controlled the decision
of the trial court. Zoning laws by their very nature
always restrict the use of someone's property in a
manner which may create unhappiness on at least part
of those within the zoning district. It is invariably true
that one living on one side of the boundary of the zoning district will be precluded from doing something
which the neighbor across the artificial line can do.
Zoning ordinances, therefore, are in all cases a restriction on the free and untrammelled right of property
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o\\~nPrs to use their property as the~· 1nay individually
desire. Nevertheless, Salt Lake County adopted its general zoning ordinances (Exh. D-3), which were effective
on June 15, 1957, and which specifically authorized trailer
camps in Agricultural Zone A-2. In this general ordinance an automobile trailer is defined as "a vehicle with
or without motive power used or designed to be used for
human habitation." In the same ordinance a trailer camp
is defined as "Any area or tract of land used or designated to accommodate two or more automobile trailers
or camping parties." (Section 8-1-5, subsections (67) and
(68) ). There can be no question that the subsequent 1961
"Mobile Home Park Ordinance"' a1nended these provisions with respect to trailer camps.

There can also be no doubt but that the general1957
Zoning Ordinances which permitted trailer camps in
Agricultural Zone A-2 must, of necessity, after the 1961
a1nendments, permit mobile horne parks in Agricultural
Zone A-2.
The 1961 ordinance controlling the construction and
use of mobile home parks, provides in Section 5-4-9 that
"the minimum area for any mobile home park shall be
five acres". Section 5-4-10 provides that each park shall
provide
"mobile horne spaces and each such space shall
be clearly defined or delineated. Each space shall
have an area of not less than 3,000 square feet,
exclusive of streets and sidewalks, and a width of
not less than 40 feet".
The latest ordinance of Salt Lake County with respect
to spacing and size therefore specifically provides that
each 1nobile home must have not less than 3,000 square
feet. -One cannot read the 1961 mobile home park ordinances without realizing that Salt Lake County has
provided here for attractiYe, beautiful, well-planned, coordinated and engineered parks with modern sanitary
s<>wag-<', lighting, and heating facilities to be available for
28
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parh mohilP homP. This Court should not be misled into
lwliPvin~ that tlw Inobile honw parks under discussion
woulrl lw "~heepherder camps or cattle camps".
ThPre is nothing inconsistent with the fact that Salt
Lake County provided lots for residences in Agricultural
Zone A-:2 ~hould be of not less than one acre in size for
homes and at the smne time by independent ordinances
al~o provided that mobile home parks should be no
smallPr than five acres for each park with not less than
:~,000 ~quare feet for each mobile home. It is further
provided that where any boundary of a mobile home park
abuts on a residential home or on property zoned for
residential construction that a "six foot high fence wall
or hedge properly related to surrounding topography and
the eharacter of the surrounding development shall be
provided along such boundary."
The detailed requirements for the construction of
~ueh a mobile home park assure all property owners that
when eompleted such a park will be a credit to the area
in which it is constructed. At any rate, this is a legislatin' matter which Salt Lake County has concluded by the
adoption of the aforesaid ordinances. Appellants are in
no position to challenge the wisdom of these provisions
of the Salt Lake County Ordinances.
CONCLUSION
Judge Hanson granted Respondent a summary
judgment in the trial court, dismissing Plaintiff-Appellants' eause of action. He gave as his reasons for this
ruling that Appellants failed to exhaust their administratiYf' re1nedies, that they slept on their rights and "are
not in a position at this date to resort to the courts for
the purpose of prohibiting Respondents' building prog-ram". Other reasons were urged by Respondents as
justification for their summary judgment. Although not
cited by the trial court as reasons for deciding the case in
favor of Respondents, estoppel and the illegality of the
amending ordinance (for example, it was "spot zoning")
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were argued and briefed for that court. Each and everyone of these reasons for justification of the lower court's
ruling are properly present for consideration and adoption by this Court. These issues were framed for trial
below and obviously should this Court conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate at this stage, Respondents 1nust be afforded an opportunity to fully try these
framed issues. Under no circumstances should this court
reverse the trial court without requiring that the disputed
factual issues be fully tried.
However, Respondent reasserts its position that
there is ample undisputed evidence to sustain the summary judgn1ent in favor of Defendants. The summary
judgn1ent issued below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & :MANGU:M
By :MAX K. MANGUM
206 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Cottonwood 11! ('adows Company
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